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Abstract: This paper examines the effect of legal and financial conditions on the payment 
contract choice by empirically testing the predictions of Schmidt-Eisenlohr’s (2013) model 
with actual bilateral industry level trade finance data (at 2-digit level) from Turkey. Our 
results show that an improvement in contract enforcement and an increase in the financing 
cost in the importing country (exporting country) increases (decreases) the share of post-
shipment sales. For the share of pre-payment sales, the opposite effects are estimated. Finally 
we find that share of post-shipment sales (pre-payment sales) increases (decreases) in the 
number of products traded between partners in the past.  
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Trade finance is the lifeblood for international trade. More than 90% of cross border 
transactions are underpinned by some form of financing, mainly short-term credit (Auboin, 
2007). Following the financial crisis in 2008-2009, survey reports show that this credit has 
become more expensive and that global trade experienced a substantial decline in 
consequence.4 G20 countries agreed to implement $250 billion trade finance support for two 
years to boost the credits available to firms in 2009. Scholars have paid utmost attention to 
this issue and many studies explored the link between financial conditions and trade 
especially in the post-crisis era [including, but not limited to Greenaway et al. (2007), Muuls 
(2008), van der Veer (2010), Amiti and Weinstein (2011), Chor and Manova (2012), Manova 
(2013)].  
Trade finance is broadly defined as the methods and instruments designed to support 
exporters and importers throughout the trade cycle (Menichini, 2009). Apart from financing, 
trade finance mechanisms help exporters and importers to mitigate or reduce their risks 
associated with doing business internationally. Serving the global marketplace brings many 
limitations and risks to the firms that they may not have on the domestic side. Trading firms 
have to pay ongoing trade costs (tariffs, freight, etc.) and challenge a set of cross country 
differences in economic conditions, culture, political and legal factors. Further, they face 
many uncertainties in executing their transactions such as currency and credit risks.  In any 
form of trade, the most important thing is to get paid in full and on time for the seller and to 
receive the goods as specified for the buyer. There is a high degree of incomplete information 
between trading partners when engaging in cross border trade, and thus an appropriate 
method of payment has to be chosen in order to minimize the default and non-delivery risks.  
Trade finance offer a range of payment mechanisms that enable exporters to obtain 
secure and timely payment from importers while enabling the importers to obtain the 
shipment of goods as stated in the contract. Generally, there are four common methods of 
payment for international transactions: open account (OA), cash-in advance (CIA), letter of 
credit (L/C) and cash against documents (CAD).5 Each of the four payment methods have 
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different risk levels and provides a different level of protection to exporters and importers. In 
an OA sale, the shipment takes place before the payment is due, whereas the payment is 
received before the delivery under CIA transactions. Offering OA terms makes an exporter 
competitive in the international market but brings substantial default risk. CIA method, on 
the other hand, removes the above noted risk, however the exporter can lose its market share 
to its counterparts which offer more attractive financing options. Between these two 
extremes, banks also offer L/C or CAD to prevent the risk of default and non-delivery 
between the exporter and importer, provided that all terms and conditions as specified in the 
L/C or CAD have been fully met. 
Although trade finance performs a wide range of functions in facilitating international 
transactions, this paper primarily focuses on the payment aspect of trade finance.6 As 
emphasized by Auboin and Engemann (2013), the focus on the payment contract choice in 
international trade is a novel approach to understanding the structure and functioning of the 
trade finance market, and their role and impact on trade flows in times of financial crisis 
because that understanding can help policy-makers to take appropriate policy actions and 
measures in a timely fashion to mitigate the impact of the financial crisis on the trade finance 
markets, which in turn limits the negative effects of financial crisis in the future. While the 
literature convincingly points out the importance of the essential linkages between trade 
finance and trade flows, both theoretical and empirical research on the payment contract 
choice in trade flows remain limited. 7  
As noted by Auboin and Engemann (2013) and Love (2013), the main limitation to 
explore the different types of trade finance and their determinants is that detailed actual data 
on payment methods in trade transactions is very little. The available information is mainly 
derived from the surveys.8 Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) derives a theoretical model to address 
the trade-off firms have between three different payment forms in international trade and the 
cross country differences in their use. The main novelty in this paper is the fact that the 
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formal model predicts the financial and legal conditions in both the source and the 
destination country as the determinants of the cross country difference in trade finance  
For an abridged description of the model, consider two risk-neutral importing and 
exporting firms that play a one shot game where the exporter makes a take it or leave it offer 
to the importer. This proposal specifies not only the price and quantity but also the type of 
the payment in the particular transaction. In this setting, there are two problems arising: a 
financing problem stemming from the time gap between the delivery and payment; and a 
commitment problem because of the advanced financing by one of the trading partners. 
Under OA (CIA), exporter (importer) has to finance the transaction using her country’s 
financial system. As per the commitment problem, contract enforcement takes place in the 
importer’s (exporter’s) country if the OA (CIA) method is chosen. Financing by the firm in 
the country with lower financing costs and weaker enforcement maximizes the exporter 
profit. Therefore, if contract enforcement in importer’s (exporter’s) country strengthens, OA 
(CIA) becomes more attractive. In terms of financing costs, exporters (importers) in countries 
with less financing costs will be more willing to execute the transaction via OA (CIA) terms.  
Using data on bilateral trade flows of 150 countries over the period 1980-2004, 
Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) indirectly tests the predictions of the payment contract choice 
model by aggregate gravity regressions and finds evidence that, as predicted, financial 
conditions and contract environments both in exporting and importing country matter for 
trade. In particular, the empirical results show that countries with higher financial costs trade 
less with each other and the size of this effect increases as the geographical distance between 
trading partners, a proxy for time to trade, increases. 
Hoefele et al. (2013) takes a further step and directly test the predictions of the model 
utilizing the World Bank Enterprise Survey data for firms from 54 developing countries over 
the period between 2006 and 2009. The main disadvantage of this survey is that it does not 
break down the information on OA sales into domestic and international, even if it 
documents the share of exports in total sales. Antras and Foley (2013) use the data for a 
single large US exporter and this study, to our knowledge, is the only one which employs 
actual data in this line of research. Their findings suggest that exports to more distant 
countries and countries with weak enforcement are more likely to occur on CIA terms or L/C 
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terms. They also show that the use of post-shipment method (OA) increases as the 
relationship between trading partners improves.9  
Although conceptually related, our paper brings significant improvements over the 
above noted previous work. First, the detailed Turkish two-digit industry data provides not 
only the trade volumes in each industry but also the volume of exports shipped under 
different payment terms.10 This allows us to test the theoretical model of Schmidt-Esienlohr 
(2013) not only for post-shipment transactions but also for pre-payment. Second, the data 
reports the destination markets, which allows us to work with a balanced panel for industry-
export market pairs. This feature of the dataset paves the way to analyze the effect of legal 
and financial conditions both in Turkey and in the particular trading partner. In this regard, 
our study represents the first attempt to investigate payment choice in international trade 
using three-dimensional (industry-destination-year) bilateral export data.11  
Hence, given the growing role of trade financing in trade flows and a lack of 
sufficient quantitative evidence, this paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by 
investigating the effect of legal and financial conditions on the payment contract choice using 
a unique bilateral trade finance data from Turkey at the 2-digit level of ISIC Revision 3. 
Turkey, especially considering the post-2000 period, is a particularly useful starting point for 
our investigation. From 2002 to 2012, in particular, Turkey’s exports have increased almost 
fivefold from 30.9 billion US dollars to 138.4 billion US dollars.12,13 With respect to the 
extensive margin, the Exporter Dynamics Database of the World Bank shows that the 
number of exporting firms increased from 30,000 to 48,000 and the number of exporters per 
export destination increased from 500 to 1000 between 2002 and 2010.14 The number of 
export markets with an export volume over 1 billion USD increased from 5 in 2000 to more 
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than 30 in 2010. 15 In addition to all these points, share of top 10 markets in Turkey’s total 
exports decreased from 62 percent in 2000 to 48 percent in 2010. Overall, Turkey is a 
suitable country for the analysis on types of trade finance not only because of the 
disaggregated data but also because of the increase in its ties with global markets and the 
pattern of diversification in its exports over the period of our sample.16 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: an improvement in the enforcement 
and an increase in the financing costs in the importing country (exporting country) increases 
(decreases) the share of post-shipment sales.17  For the share of pre-payment, the opposite 
effects are estimated for the enforcement and financing costs. Finally, share of post-shipment 
sales (pre-payment sales) increases (decreases) in the number of more products traded 
between partners in the previous year. The last finding points out the importance of 
developing a relationship and building trust in terms of choosing the appropriate payment 
method in cross border trade.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the data 
and its sources and provides key findings and trends on the usage of payment methods in 
Turkey across income groups, regions as well as industry groups. In section 3, we describe 
our econometric model. Section 4 reports the empirical results. Finally, we conclude in 
Section 5.      
 
2. Data and some patterns 
TURKSTAT’s database on methods of payments in Turkish exports, which contains 
detailed bilateral data in terms of trade finance instruments for over 270 countries (including 
the free-trade zones) classified according to the International Standard Industrial 
Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC, Revision 3) at the 2-digit level was used to 
investigate the empirical validity of the Schmidt-Eisenlohr’s (2013) theoretical model. Data 
availability in TURKSTAT’s database spans from 2002 to 2013. Beside free trade zones, we 
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exclude some countries from our analysis, often due to the absence of trade or changes in 
political boundaries. Thus, bilateral trade finance data from Turkey with 206 countries over 
the period 2002-2012 at the 2-digit level of ISIC Revision 3 was used in the empirical 
analysis.  
This unique database documents the total amount of exports data using a specific 
payment method  in value (in thousands of US dollars at the current prices) and in quantities 
(where quantities are reported in different units of measure, such as kilograms, meters, liters, 
square meters, and such like) at the 2-digit level of ISIC Revision 3. Many different types of 
payment methods exist in the database and types vary greatly from year to year. In order to 
make a consistent analysis from year-to-year, these are grouped into five main categories: 
OA, CIA, CAD, L/C and other. In carrying out the study, we restrict ourselves to 
manufacturing industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37, but excluding recycling (ISIC 
37). 18 Furthermore, in order to shed some light on the usage of trade finance instruments 
across industry groups, we have classified the manufacturing industries into four categories 
according to their technological intensity: low-technology, medium-low-technology, 
medium-high-technology and high-technology, based on OECD’s Technology classification 
of manufacturing industries. 
The industry data is matched with two cross-country data. First, for the contract 
enforcement, we used the rule of law index obtained from the World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. As noted in Glady and Potin (2011) and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013), 
this index is a convenient proxy for the quality of contract enforcement, property rights and 
courts. Second, following Glady and Potin (2011), Hoefele et al. (2013), the financial costs 
are proxied by the net interest margin which is the net interest income of the banks relative to 
their total earning assets. Alternatively, we also employed private credit over GDP to proxy 
the general financial development as a robustness check. Both variables come from the 
World Bank Global Financial Development Database.  
Finally, we utilized the World Bank World Development Indicators for GDP per 
capita and United States Department of Agriculture’s website for exchange rate.  The number 
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of exported products within industries was obtained from the United Nations Commodity 
Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade), which contains data for over 5,000 items at the 
Harmonized System’s (HS, Revision 1996) six-digit level. The first lag of this variable is 
used to measure the level of past trading relationship which improves the trust between 
parties by reducing the informational barriers. We manually constructed this variable by 
summing up the total HS six-digit products within the industry exported to a particular export 
destination.   
Table 1 documents the average use of each payment method between 2002 and 2012. 
As shown, Turkey’s exports are mainly financed via post-shipment methods (exporter 
finance), the riskiest method of payment. OA terms counts for 58% and CAD terms counts 
for 19% on average over the years of the sample.19 This finding is in line with the prediction 
of Schmidt-Eisenlohr’s (2013) model that exports to importers located in countries with 
strong contract enforcement is more likely to occur on OA terms, given the fact that Turkey’s 
exports are still heavily concentrated on European markets where contracts are more 
effectively enforced by courts, as compared to Turkey.  
On the other hand, Figure 1 and 2 show that the use of CIA method dramatically 
increased in the last decade. In terms of its share in all methods of payments, CIA method 
increased almost fivefold. In 2012, more than 20 billion dollars of Turkish exports were 
executed via CIA compared to 500 million dollars in 2002. The change in the share of CIA 
sales appears more remarkable when compared to the 10% increase in the share of OA sales 
for the same time period. The growing share of CIA method in Turkish exports is likely due 
to the reorientation of Turkey’s exports towards faster growing non-traditional markets (such 
as the Middle East and Africa) where the financial system is under-developed and contract 
enforcement is weak.  
We turn next to the comparison of payment methods for different country groups. As 
shown in Table 1, CIA method was mostly preferred when trading with Asian, Middle 
Eastern and Low-income countries, which is consistent with Love (2013) which suggests that 
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the CIA terms are most often used when trading partners are located in low-income countries. 
The change in the share of CIA terms is around 150% for low income countries and around 
600 % for Middle Eastern countries over the years of our sample. In 2012, the share of CIA 
transactions increased from 9.2 to 35.4 percent in Middle Eastern countries.20 This change 
stands out as the largest change in the pattern of trade finance in terms of regional 
comparisons of all payment methods. In terms of the L/C transactions, Asian, African and 
Middle Eastern countries rank the top 3 for this method.21 For the EU-zone countries as well 
as other developed countries, OA terms dominate the transactions. Figure 5 shows that more 
than 70% of total exports to Europe and 65% of total exports to rich countries occurred under 
OA terms in 2012.22. This also provides a preview of our empirical results in line with the 
contractual enforcement hypothesis. 
We also reported the share of each trade finance method for different technology 
intensity of the industries in Table 1 and Figure 4. Medium-low technology industries 
represent the largest share in terms of pre-payment transactions, whereas high-tech industries 
represent the largest share in terms of post-shipment terms. This evidence seems to be 
consistent with the explanation suggested by Menichini (2009) for the role of traded goods 
characteristics on the payment choice: firms producing vertically differentiated high quality 
goods may offer more trade credit (OA) to their trading partners than firms producing 
standardized goods.23 The industry data also suggests that medium-low technology industries 
rely more heavily on L/C than other industries. Relatively higher share of L/C observed in 
these industries shows that the non-traditional markets, particularly Asian, African and 
Middle Eastern countries, have become increasingly important markets for medium quality 
Turkish products in recent years.  
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 This finding is also observed in BIS (2014), which show that the Asia-Pacific region relies most heavily on 
L/C. The literature has identified several factors accountable for the higher usage of intermediated trade finance 
(L/C): longer distances between trading partners, newly formed trade relationships, weak enforcement of 
international contracts and under-developed banking sectors (Glady and Potin, 2011). In addition to these 
factors, in the context of Asia historical preferences, legal frameworks, regulatory differences as well as 
relatively cheap L/C fees are proposed (BIS, 2014).  
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 The similar patterns were also noted in Love (2013). 
23
 For additional discussion and empirical evidence on the inter-firm credit relationship, see Ng et al. (1999), 
Cunat (2007),  Giannetti et al. (2011) and Love (2013).  
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Table 2, on the other hand, documents the changes in shares of methods of payments 
due to 2008-2009 crises. While Turkey’s manufacturing exports fell drastically by 23.15 
percent during the crisis, the share of the CIA was surprisingly increased by around 24 
percent.24 This means that Turkish exporters started to use more CIA, the safest method of 
payment, during the crisis. Perhaps, the most striking point in Table 2 is the large increase in 
CIA transactions for Middle Eastern countries after the crises. Turkish exporters preferred 
this method mostly because of the loss in confidence to the contract enforcement in these 
countries as this period coincides with political instability in the region. This shift towards 
the CIA method when trading with the Middle Eastern countries also had a large negative 
impact on the volume of trade.25 Table 3 shows that Turkey’s total exports to the Middle 
Eastern countries was decreased by 27.5 % after the global recession. This point can also 
partially explain the deflection of trade to the African countries after the crisis.26    
Another interesting fact observed from the industry data is that the use of L/C in 
international transactions decreased in the post-crises era.27 This finding is not surprising 
given the fact that the L/C fees increased substantially because of the worldwide financial 
meltdown. In fact, the share of the use of L/C was decreased by around 30% shortly after the 
global recession in 2008 (Table 2).28 A sharper decrease (48%) is observed in L/C 
transactions for the exports to the developed countries. The largest decline in the growth rate 
of exports after the global recession was also observed for the exports to the developed 
countries (Table 3). Not surprisingly, as shown in Figure 1, overall Turkish exports 
experience a sharp decline in 2008-2009 period, but recovers in 3 years following the crisis.  
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importance of CIA method relative to the pure bank financing for a sample of European and Central Asian firms 
during the crisis.  
25
 It is important to bear in mind that several empirical studies including Bricongne et al., 2012 and Behrens et 
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rather, the collapse of aggregate demand and the decline in commodity prices were the leading causes of the 
sharp decline in trade.  
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 BIS (2014) documents that the share of L/C in Turkish total exports has dropped from around 26 percent in 
1998 to 15 percent in 2012 and suggest that the expanding network of long-term trade relationships reduces the 
need for L/C in Turkey over time.  
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In sum, there are four main observations which are suggested by the raw data before 
proceeding to the formal econometric analysis. First, OA terms dominate the cross border 
transactions in terms of exports. Second, although pre-payment terms represent a smaller 
share, their share is on the rise dramatically. Third, pre-payment terms were mostly used 
when trading with Asian, Middle Eastern and Low-income countries but post-shipment terms 
were preferred when trading with developed world. Last but not the least, the share of the use 
of L/C transactions decreased substantially shortly after the global recession in 2008.  
3. Empirical analysis 
While Schmidt-Eisenlohr’s (2013) model is quite successful in explaining stylized 
facts regarding the usage of payment methods in Turkey, a more careful empirical analysis is 
needed to assess the role of contract enforcement and financial costs on the payment choice. 
In order to quantify the effect of contract enforcement and financial cost of trading partners 
on different payment choices, we estimate the following models: 
 =  + 
 +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +        (1)       
 =  + 
 +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +       (2) 
 where i denotes the exporting country, h denotes the industry at 2-digit level of ISIC 
Revision 3, j denotes the importing country, t denotes time in years,  and  
represent the share of exports occurred under post-shipment terms and pre-payment terms, 
respectively. OA and CAD are classified as post-shipment, whereas CIA and L/C is classified 
as pre-payment term.29  
  is the contract enforcement in export destination (importing country) and 
 denotes the contract enforcement in Turkey (exporting country). Similarly,   and 
 denotes the financing costs in the export destination (importing country) and Turkey 
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documentary collection (CAD) are considered as post- shipment terms while CIA as pre-payment terms. 
Although they argue that the choice between L/C terms and post-shipment terms should be similar to the choice 
between CIA and post-shipment terms in the theoretical part of the paper, they conduct separate regressions for 
L/C and CIA in the empirical part of the paper. Our results are insensitive to treating only OA as post-shipment 
and only CIA as pre-payment term.  
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(exporting country), respectively. Contract enforcement is measured by the rule of law index. 
Financing costs are measured by net interest margin and private credit over GDP in different 
specifications.30 
 Many country-level factors can affect the payment choice in international transactions 
such as the distance between trading partners, cultural ties and trade agreements. Moreover, 
some industry characteristics or product features (complexity, technology intensity) might 
also affect the particular trade relationship in terms of payment choice. Therefore, in order to 
control for country and industry level heterogeneity, we include  as the import country 
effects (export market fixed effects) and  as the industry fixed effects. For the aggregate 
variations in Turkey such as business cycle and current account shocks, we used time fixed 
effects, .  
The testable implication of the Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) model is that β2 and β3 are 
positive. The share of post-shipment use in exports is predicted to increase in the 
enforcement of the destination country, since enforcement takes place there in such a 
transaction. In addition, firms have less ability to obtain credit with higher financing costs in 
the buyer’s country; and thus Turkish exporters’ likelihood of offering post-shipment 
transactions increases in such a situation.  
  On the other hand, an improvement in contract enforcement in Turkey makes post-
shipment terms less attractive to the buyer. Moreover, higher financing costs in Turkey is 
predicted to decrease the share of exports occurred under post-shipment terms given the fact 
that the ability of the exporting firms to finance the transaction weakens with higher 
financing costs. Consequently, we expect a negative sign for β4 and β5. 
 
When it comes to equation (2), the signs of the coefficients are predicted to be the 
exact opposite of their counterparts in equation (1). Everything else equal, a variable which 
affects the share of post-shipment transactions positively, affects the pre-payment 
transactions negatively. Therefore, we expect a negative sign for 
,   and a positive sign 
for and .   
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Another crucial factor that can affect the choice of payments in global trade is the 
trust between trading partners. Established trading relationships decrease the risk of 
asymmetric information; and thus riskier method of payments can be tolerated as the 
relationship develops. For this consideration, we included “the number of different products 
exported within the same industry at the year  − 1	” to our model.31 We believe that 
industries which export more products to a particular export destination, gathers better 
information about the market and develops a certain level of trust. In addition, firms in the 
same industry are often connected via unions, trade associations, and other business 
organizations and more information is shared within the industry as more products are 
shipped to a particular export market. As a result, this variable should positively affect the 
likelihood of observing more post-shipment, less pre-payment transactions.    
The analysis also uses two other country level factors. Since contractual enforcement 
is better in developed countries, we include the logarithm of GDP per capita of both trading 
partners to ensure that the rule of law does not pick up the effect of the income of the 
countries.32 Second, we also used exchange rate between the two countries. Besides the risk 
of default and non-delivery, firms that trade internationally are also exposed to exchange rate 
risk. The exchange rate could change between the time of entering the contract and the actual 
payment for goods involved. For instance, an exporter loses profits in terms of domestic 
currency in the event of an appreciation of the exporter’s currency if it is not properly 
protected from loss. In order to sustain profitability and cash flow from exchange rate 
fluctuations, exporters may require importers to prepay for goods shipped. 33 As a result, the 
exporter prefers using pre-payment terms as opposed to post-shipment terms whenever the 
Turkish Lira appreciates.  Both the GDP per capita and the exchange rate are hence predicted 
to be positive in equation (1), but negative in equation (2).34  
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We begin presenting our results in Table 4.35 Each specification is estimated via OLS 
using industry and importer fixed effects and standard errors are clustered for importer-
industry combinations. The dependent variable is the share of exports executed under post-
shipment terms in a particular industry in Turkey. The financing costs are measured by net 
interest margin in this table. The first specification reports the estimates with only the 
enforcement and net interest margin in the importing country. In the second specification, we 
include exporting country contract enforcement and financing costs as well. Finally, the last 
specification includes the other control variables.  
The contract enforcement and net interest margin both in the importing and exporting 
country are shown significant in Table 4. In accordance with the contract enforcement 
hypothesis, coefficient estimates suggest that an improvement in the enforcement in the 
importing country (exporting country) increases (decreases) the post-shipment sales.  To 
gauge economic significance, consider a standard deviation increase in the enforcement in 
the importing country based on specification 3. Such an increase will have a marginal effect 
of 0.043 to the share of post-shipment exports. This change in the enforcement in the 
importing country corresponds to 6 billion US dollar of exports over the years of our sample.  
Table 4 also suggests a significant positive effect of the financing costs in the 
importing country and a negative effect of the financing costs in the exporting country on the 
share of post-shipment transactions. In terms of the magnitude of the effect, the estimations 
in specification 3 suggests that a 1% increase in the net interest margin of the importing 
country increases the net interest margin by 0.003%. If an importing country at the 25 
percentile in net interest margin moves to 75th percentile, the share of post-shipment sales 
will increase by 0.01% by such a change.  
In Table 5, we document the estimates of the payment choice model where the net 
interest margin is replaced by private credit over GDP to proxy financial costs. Since the 
                                                          
35
 Table A1 shows the summary statistics of the final data. We have around 34000 observations for the baseline 




increase in private credit over GDP is associated with a decrease in the financing costs, the 
signs of the estimates are reversed for this variable. As shown, our results are insensitive to 
the measure we use for financing costs. In both models, we obtain strong support for the 
payment choice model.  
In addition to all these points, the results in both tables suggest the effect of past 
trading relationships on the methods of payments. We believe that, more firms are engaging 
in international trade if more products are shipped within the same industry; and this helps 
the firms in two different countries overcome the informational barriers associated with the 
transaction. As the importer and exporter develop a trading relationship, transactions are less 
likely to be executed under pre-payment terms.36 Therefore, we hypothesized that the share 
of post-shipment sales should increase with the number of products exported in the previous 
year within the same industry. This hypothesis is strongly supported with the coefficient 
estimates both in Table 4 and Table 5. The importance of this variable is also observed with 
its marginal effect equivalent to a standard deviation increase in the contract enforcement in 
the importing country. The coefficient estimates show that a 1% increase in the number of 
exported products within the same industry in the previous year (stronger trading relations) is 
associated with around 0.04 % increase in the share of post-shipment sales in Turkish 
exports.  
Having reported the estimates on the share of post-shipment sales, we move to the 
results of the payment choice model where we used the share of pre-payment transactions. 
Table 6 shows the results where the financing costs are proxied by net interest margin. 
Consistent with our predictions, the signs of the coefficient estimates are reversed as 
compared to Table 4. Although the variables denoting the financing costs and contract 
enforcement in Turkey falls short of being significant, the variables denoting them in the 
importing country is shown significant across specifications. The negative coefficient on the 
contract enforcement in the importing country indicates that Turkish exporters use pre-
payment terms less frequently than post-shipment when serving the markets where there is 
greater confidence in the legal system. In terms of the financing costs, the negative 
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 See Antras and Foley (2013). 
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coefficient on the net interest margin suggests that higher financing costs in the buyers’ 
country decreases the share of pre-payment sales given the fact that such an effect makes it 
harder for them to obtain credit to finance the transaction. 
The estimated effect between the number of products exported in the previous year 
and the share of pre-payment sales in exports is also telling in Table 6. As opposed to the 
post-payment sales, we observe a negative sign for this variable. As the number of trade 
transactions increase, it is less likely to observe pre-payment terms and thus the share of the 
pre-payment sales decreases.  
Table 7 demonstrates the regression estimates for equation (2) when the private credit 
over GDP is used for financial conditions.  The results are similar to the earlier estimates. 
The third specification in Table (7) provides significant estimate for the contract enforcement 
in the exporting country as well. All of the coefficients have the expected sign.  Taken 
together, our results are insensitive to the choice of the financing costs variable and the 
dependent variable we use. Both for the pre-payment and post-shipment estimates, we obtain 
strong support for the Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) model.   
Another notable point to highlight in our estimations is the effect of exchange rate on 
the method of payments. Although GDP per capita does not show a significant impact, the 
effect of exchange rate is significant across specifications in all of the tables. In terms of the 
effect of the exchange rate on different payment terms, our results suggest that the 
depreciation of Turkish Lira increases the share of post-shipment sales whereas decreases the 
share of pre-payment ones, as expected. The results further point out that depreciation of 
Turkish Lira has increased the Turkish exporters’ competitiveness in the international 
market, which improves their ability to extend credit to their trading partners. 
5. Conclusion 
Trade finance is a vital element of global trade and more than 90% of international 
transactions are buttressed by some form of financing. Survey evidence suggests that the 
dramatic slowdown in international trade after the global recession was partly due to the 
increase in the cost of obtaining credit to finance the transactions. Consequently, the effect of 
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trade finance on global trade flows has been attracting increasing attention from both scholars 
and policy makers of late.  
 Whether the financing conditions in the source country affects the export flows has 
been widely examined in the literature, but, empirical works analyzing what type of financing 
methods are used to execute international transactions and how the conditions in both 
importer’s and exporter’s country affect these payment choice are scarce. The main challenge 
for the scholars is the availability of reliable and comprehensive dataset on the usage of 
different payment methods. Attempts to understand the choice between different payment 
methods may provide useful information to policymakers in formulating effective and timely 
measures in times of crisis. In this regard, we represent the first attempt to analyze the 
payment choice in global trade using a novel bilateral trade data at the 2-digit industry level 
from Turkey.  
Using actual data on the method of payments in international transactions, our formal 
econometric analysis directly tests the Schmidt-Eisenlohr’s (2013) theoretical implications. 
Our findings suggest that an improvement in the enforcement and an increase in the 
financing costs in the importing country (exporting country) increases (decreases) the share 
of sales occurred under post-shipment terms. For the share of pre-payment sales, the opposite 
effects are estimated for the enforcement and financing costs. 
Our findings further suggest a relationship between past trading relationships and the 
method of payments in international trade. Transactions are more likely to be executed under 
post-shipment terms as firms develop trading relationships. Measuring the past trading 
relationship with the number of products traded within the same industry in the previous 
year, we show that the share of post-shipment sales increases and pre-payment sales 
decreases when the number of products traded between partners increases over the previous 
year. This shows the importance of building trust in terms of choosing the appropriate 
payment method. 
There are some conclusions emerging from looking at the raw data as well. We first 
observed that Turkey’s exports are mainly financed via OA. Although pre-payment terms 
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represent a smaller share, their share is on the rise dramatically. Numerically speaking, the 
share of CIA transactions was increased by more than 300% between 2002 and 2012. In 
addition, pre-payment terms were mostly used when trading with Asian, Middle Eastern and 
Low-income countries but post-shipment terms were preferred when trading with developed 
world. Furthermore, the share of the use of the L/C transactions in Turkey’s exports 
decreased substantially shortly after the global recession in 2008.   
 There are several avenues for future research in this area using disaggregated 
payment contract data. For instance, it would be interesting to study the effect of trade policy 
on the method of payments in international transactions. Many countries liberalize their trade 
via trade agreements. Analyzing the impact of these integrations on the usage of trade finance 
methods can be fruitful. In addition, the shift in the method of payments can impose a 
restriction to the trading partners and one can test whether this restriction affect the survival 
of trading relationships in the international market. Different payment methods can also 
affect the intensive and extensive margin of trade. Finally, the effect of business cycles, 
financial crisis, and current account and exchange rate shocks on the payment choice is still a 
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Table A1. Classification of manufacturing industries based on technology 
Industries ISIC Rev. 3 
High-technology industries  
Aircraft and spacecraft 353 
Pharmaceuticals 2423 
Office, accounting and computing machinery 30 
Radio, TV and communications equipment 32 
Medical, precision and optical instruments 33 
Medium-high-technology industries  
Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c 31 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34 
Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals 24 excl. 2423 
Railroad equipment and transport equipment, n.e.c 352+359 
Machinery and equipment, n.e.c 29 
Medium-low-technology industries  
Building and repairing of ships and boats 351 
Rubber and plastic products 25 
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 23 
Other non-metallic mineral products 26 
Basic metals and fabricated metal products 27-28 
Low-technology industries  
Manufacturing, n.e.c., Recycling 36-37 
Wood, pulp, paper products, printing and publishing 20-22 
Food products, beverages and tobacco 15-16 
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 17-19 
Total manufacturing 15-37 





Table A2. Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
Enforcement in the Importing Country  -0.057 1.002 
Net Interest Margin in the Importing Country 4.826 3.050 
Enforcement in Exporting Country 0.076 0.060 
Net Interest Margin in Exporting Country 5.918 2.388 
Private Credit in Exporting Country 25.479 10.112 
Private Credit in the Importing Country 50.129 48.681 
GDP per capita of the Importing Country* 8.136 1.622 
GDP per capita of the Exporting Country 8.918 0.093 
Exchange Rate 1.484 0.145 
# of exported products exported in h at t-1* 1.840 1.795 
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Figure 3 Share of Methods of Payments in Exports (in percent, 2002-2012)
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Figure 4  Shares of Methods of Payments in Exports by Income level (in percent, 2002-2012)
Open Account Cash in Advance Cash against Documents
















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5  Shares of Methods of Payments in Exports by Region (in percent, 2002-2012)
Open Account Cash in Advance Cash against Documents
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Table 1: Average usage of methods of payments in Turkey’s exports by income, region and 
industry group, (in percent, 2002-2012)  
Sample OA CIA CAD L/C Other 
Low income 45.91 8.92 15.69 28.49 0.99 
Lower middle income 48.00 8.85 17.32 24.11 1.72 
Upper middle income 52.99 8.68 20.14 16.34 1.85 
High income 60.37 4.83 18.61 12.90 3.28 
Europe 65.36 4.23 19.88 7.04 3.48 
America 48.98 6.05 17.01 24.15 3.81 
Asia 35.92 8.99 15.90 36.39 2.81 
Middle East 39.60 8.51 18.78 31.88 1.23 
Africa 39.78 6.49 20.69 32.03 1.00 
Low-technology 70.31 3.65 18.52 6.72 0.79 
Medium-low-tech 44.02 8.18 13.18 32.16 2.46 
Medium-high-tech 53.90 6.48 26.20 7.68 5.75 
High-tech 76.67 2.42 3.77 14.04 3.11 












Table 2: Changes in shares of methods of payments in  exports due to 2008-2009 crisis by 
income, region and industry group, (in percent, 2009 vs. 2008) 
Sample OA CIA CAD L/C Other 
Low income 6.29 -22.58 -3.01 2.39 -12.27 
Lower middle income -11.29 47.88 9.12 0.17 -12.11 
Upper middle income -0.75 -14.27 8.63 3.04 -27.05 
High income 10.62 35.20 2.34 -48.85 -7.14 
Europe 3.21 22.57 -4.05 -33.58 -10.91 
America 8.52 15.06 70.30 -53.37 -28.05 
Asia -7.86 -22.67 -7.67 30.92 -46.11 
Middle East 39.01 67.94 41.72 -46.91 -10.32 
Africa -4.00 33.37 0.20 -1.71 -25.11 
Low-technology -0.82 10.91 0.04 1.66 24.20 
Medium-low-tech 16.71 73.93 17.99 -35.40 -27.96 
Medium-high-tech -0.12 -4.73 1.92 7.15 -8.73 
High-tech 1.81 13.07 19.91 -7.39 -21.30 







Table 3. Changes in value and shares of Turkey’s exports by income, region and 
industry group, (2009 vs. 2008) 
Sample 
Value ($ millions) Share (%) 
2008 2009 Change 
(%) 
2008 2009 Change 
(%) 
Low income 1,432 1,421 -0.77 1.22 1.57 29.12 
Lower middle income 9,023 8,353 -7.43 7.68 9.25 20.46 
Upper middle income 23,145 21,100 -8.84 19.69 23.36 18.63 
High income 83,941 59,456 -29.17 71.41 65.82 -7.83 
Europe 64,798 49,495 -23.62 55.13 54.79 -0.61 
America 6,255 4,567 -26.98 5.32 5.06 -4.98 
Asia 4,062 3,594 -11.53 3.46 3.98 15.13 
Middle East 22,193 16,081 -27.54 18.88 17.80 -5.71 
Africa 7,480 8,874 18.63 6.36 9.82 54.36 
Low-tech 33,251 28,727 -13.61 28.29 31.80 12.42 
Medium-low-tech 40,681 28,707 -29.43 34.61 31.78 -8.17 
Medium-high-tech 40,901 30,589 -25.21 34.80 33.86 -2.68 







Notes: 1) h denotes industry (International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic 
Activities (ISIC, Revision 3) at the 2-digit level.) Enforcement is proxied by rule of law index. Each 
specification includes a constant that is suppressed. Standard errors are clustered for industry-
importing country combinations.  t statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
  
Table 4. Regression Estimates for Post-Shipment Terms 
 
Dependent variable: Share of exports executed under post-shipment terms in industry h 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Enforcement in the Importing Country  0.0673*** 0.0639*** 0.0430** 
 (4.15) (3.99) (2.78) 
Net Interest Margin  in the Importing Country 0.00197** 0.00297** 0.00366** 
 (2.50) (2.27) (2.74) 
Enforcement in the Exporting Country  -0.358*** -0.298*** 
  (-8.50) (-6.22) 
Net Interest Margin  in the Exporting Country  -0.0681*** -0.00524*** 
  (10.36) (-6.88) 
GDP per capita of the  Importing Country   0.0184 
   (0.91) 
Exchange Rate   0.0415*** 
   (2.93) 
# of exported products exported in h at t-1   0.0416** 
   (7.97) 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Export market fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.18 0.40 0.41 
Observations 34506 34506 33362 
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Notes: 1) h denotes industry (International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic 
Activities (ISIC, Revision 3) at the 2-digit level.) Enforcement is proxied by rule of law index. Each 
specification includes a constant that is suppressed. Standard errors are clustered for industry-
importing country combinations.  t statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
Table 5. Regression Estimates for Post-Shipment Terms 
 
Dependent variable: Share of exports executed under post-shipment terms in industry h 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Enforcement in the Importing Country  0.0511** 0.0548** 0.0392** 
 (2.97) (3.23) (2.38) 
Private Credit  in the Importing Country -0.000583*** -0.000683*** -0.000590*** 
 (3.98) (-4.29) (-3.70) 
Enforcement in the Exporting Country  -0.0825** -0.0871** 
  (-2.04) (-2.10) 
Private Credit  in the Exporting Country  0.00328*** 0.00285*** 
  (12.85) (8.65) 
GDP per capita of the  Importing Country   0.0499 
   (1.50) 
Exchange Rate   0.050007* 
   (1.88) 
# of exported products exported in h at t-1   0.0392*** 
   (6.85) 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Export market fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.21 0.38 0.43 
Observations 32570 32570 31844 
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Notes: 1) h denotes industry (International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic 
Activities (ISIC, Revision 3) at the 2-digit level.) Enforcement is proxied by rule of law index. Each 
specification includes a constant that is suppressed. Standard errors are clustered for industry-
importing country combinations.  t statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
 
Table 6. Regression Estimates for Pre-Payment Terms 
 
Dependent variable: Share of exports executed under pre-payment terms in industry h 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Enforcement in the Importing Country  -0.00601*** -0.00625*** -0.0125*** 
 (-5.40) (-3.97) (-7.60) 
Net Interest Margin  in the Importing Country -0.000477 -0.000968* -0.00139** 
 (-1.97) (-2.06) (-3.27) 
Enforcement in the Exporting Country  0.123 0.324 
  (0.47) (0.79) 
Net Interest Margin  in the Exporting Country  0.00278 0.00672 
  (0.44) (0.45) 
GDP per capita of the  Importing Country   -0.00645 
   (-0.33) 
Exchange Rate   -0.0134*** 
   (-3.96) 
# of exported products exported in h at t-1   -0.00316*** 
   (-4.74) 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Export market fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.12 0.29 0.36 
Observations 32526 32526 28500 
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Notes: 1) h denotes industry (International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic 
Activities (ISIC, Revision 3) at the 2-digit level.) Enforcement is proxied by rule of law index. Each 
specification includes a constant that is suppressed. Standard errors are clustered for industry-
importing country combinations.  t statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 7. Regression Estimates for Pre-Payment Terms 
 
Dependent variable: Share of exports executed under pre-payment terms in industry h 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Enforcement in the Importing Country  -0.0147*** -0.00841*** -0.0146*** 
 (-9.31) (-5.30) (-6.49) 
Private Credit  in the Importing Country 0.000269*** 0.000120*** 0.0000319** 
 (8.49) (3.73) (2.88) 
Enforcement in the Exporting Country  0.0451*** 0.0482* 
  (3.40) (1.88) 
Private Credit  in the Exporting Country  -0.00249 -0.00250 
  (-0.97) (-0.55) 
GDP per capita of the  Importing Country   -0.00536 
   (-0.31) 
Exchange Rate   -0.0492** 
   (-2.38) 
# of exported products exported in h at t-1   -0.00371*** 
   (-4.97) 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Export market fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.12 0.28 0.37 
Observations 32526 32526 28500 
